Let's Break Stuff

Content Security Policies

About me

- Senior Software Engineer at Viva IT
 (those folks in orange hoodies at some conferences & events you may have been to)
- @Brunty
- @PHPem
- mfyu.co.uk
- matt@mfyu.co.uk

Things I do

- Dungeon master for D&D campaigns
- Mentor, lead & teach apprentices & junior developers
- Run & organise PHP East Midlands
- Speak at user groups and conferences
- Break production sites with incorrectly configured content security policies

Disclaimer: I don't work with WordPress

A talk in 3 parts

XSS

CSP

Break stuff

The scary stuff

What is Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS)?

- XSS enables an attacker to inject client-side scripts into nonmalicious web pages viewed by other users
- In 2016 there was a 61% likelihood of a **browser-based** vulnerability being found in a web application
- Of those browser based vulnerabilities, 86% were found to be XSS related
- That's just over 52% of all web application vulnerabilities

 https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf


What can be done with XSS?

- Put pictures of cats in web pages
- alert('&');
- Rickroll a user
- Twitter self-retweeting tweet https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zv0kZKC6GAM
- Samy worm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_(computer_worm)

What can be done with XSS?

- Make modifications to the DOM
- Load additional scripts, resources, styles, images etc
- Access HTML5 APIs webcam, microphone, geolocation
- Steal cookies (and therefore steal session cookies)



What can be done with XSS?

KEVIN POULSEN SECURITY 03.28.08 08:00 PM

HACKERS ASSAULT EPILEPSY PATIENTS VIA COMPUTER

https://www.wired.com/2008/03/hackers-assault-epilepsy-patients-via-computer/

Stored XSS (AKA Persistent or Type I)

- Occurs when input is stored generally in a server-side database, but not always
- This could also be within a HTML5 database, thus never being sent to the server at all
- who.is was a site Rickrolled by a TXT record in the DNS of a website (yes, really)

Reflected XSS (AKA Non-persistent or Type II)


- Occurs when user input provided in the request is immediately returned - such as in an error message, search string etc
- Data is not stored, and in some instances, may not even reach the server (see the next type of XSS)


DOM-Based XSS (AKA Type-0)

- The entire flow of the attack takes place within the browser
- For example, if JavaScript in the site takes input, and uses something like document.write based on that input, it can be vulnerable to a DOM-based XSS attack

Self XSS

- Social-engineering form of XSS
- Requires the user to execute code in the browser
- Doing so via the console can't be protected by a lot of methods
- Not considered a 'true' XSS attack due to requiring the user to execute the code





What is a CSP?

HTTP response header to help reduce XSS risks

What is a CSP?

It is not a silver bullet

What is a CSP?

It is an extra layer of security

How does a CSP work?

It declares what resources are allowed to load

Browser support

Header	© Chrome	⊌ FireFox	Safari	€ IE	e Edge
Content-Security-Policy CSP Level 2	40+ Full January 2015	31+ Partial July 2014	10+	-	Edge 15 build 15002+
Content-Security-Policy CSP 1.0	25+	23+	7+	-	Edge 12 build 10240+
X-Content-Security-Policy Deprecated	-	4+	-	10+ Limited	12+ Limited
X-Webkit-CSP Deprecated	14+	-	6+	-	-

Meh, it's alright(ish) Sorry IE users

What can we protect?

- default-src
- script-src
- style-src
- img-src
- form-action
- update-insecure-requests

Full reference:

https://content-security-policy.com

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy

img-src *

Allows any URL except data: blob: filesystem: schemes.

object-src 'none'

Don't load resources from any source

style-src 'self'

Allow loading from same scheme, host and port

script-src 'unsafe-inline'

Allows use of inline source elements such as style attribute, onclick, or script tag bodies

Don't use unsafe-inline

script-src 'self' 'nonce-\$RANDOM'

<script nonce="\$RANDOM">...</script>

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' https://*.google.com 'nonce-random123'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests; form-action 'self';
```

Learn from my mistakes

I broke production with a bad CSP

Don't do what I did

Report-URI

When a policy failure occurs, the browser sends a JSON payload to that URL

```
"csp-report": {
    "blocked-uri": "self",
    "document-uri": "https://mysite.com",
    "line-number": 1,
    "original-policy": "script-src 'self'",
    "script-sample": "try {    for(var lastpass_iter=0; lastpass...",
    "source-file": "https://mysite.com",
    "violated-directive": "script-src 'self'"
```

report-uri.io

Directive	Blocked URI	Raw	Count
All \$	blocked hostname blocked path		AII \$
script-src	https://disqus.com/next/config.js	show/hide	1 🌀
script-src	eval	show/hide	1 🌀
script-src	https://c.disquscdn.com/next/embed/ common.bundle.8acee1de90e869efd b244e45c7f66630.js	show/hide	1 🌎
script-src	eval	show/hide	1 👩
script-src	eval	show/hide	1 👩
script-src	https://c.disquscdn.com/next/embed/ lounge.bundle.9becee0326ce4d1840f 8985f1dc0ce21.js	show/hide	1 🧑

Report-only

Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: [policy]; reporturi https://app.report-uri.io/r/default/csp/reportOnly;

Trial stuff before Enforcing

There will be noise, lots of noise

Tips

- Have an easy and quick way to disable the CSP in production if required
- Better yet, have a way to switch it from enforced to report only so you can get violations reported to help you debug
- Add the CSP at an application level if you need a nonce

Multiple policies

- They complicate things
- For a resource to be allowed, it must be allowed by all policies declared (problematic if an enforced policy)
- I tend to avoid them where possible on enforced policies
- But with report-only mode they can be very useful to deploy and test multiple policies at the same time (as nothing breaks for the user)

Cryptographic nonces

- Don't generate multiple nonces in the same request (but do generate a new nonce on each separate request)
- If using a templating engine (such as twig) add the nonce as a global so it's available in every template by default
- Write a helper in your template engine to generate script tags with a nonce if it's available

The problem with CSPs and CMSs

Plugins

Inline scripts (without nonces) are the enemy

Stop building dodgy plugins, avoid inline scripts & eval

Troy Hunt

[look at] making WordPress more CSP friendly

Scott Helme

Inline scripts (without nonces) are the enemy

Demo time! Let's break stuff

@scott_helme

He knows his stuff!

@mr_goodwin

He first introduced me to what a CSP is

Links & further reading

- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)
- https://content-security-policy.com
- https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy
- https://report-uri.io
- https://scotthelme.co.uk/just-how-much-traffic-can-you-generate-using-csp/
- https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/2016-edgescan-stats-report.pdf
- http://theharmonyguy.com/oldsite/2011/04/21/recent-facebook-xss-attacks-show-increasing-sophistication/
- https://github.com/Brunty/csp-demo

CSP: Let's Break Stuff @Brunty

Thank you

Questions?

@Brunty
@PHPem
mfyu.co.uk
matt@mfyu.co.uk