Security Automation: RHEL7 DoD STIG Update

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45 MINUTES, 3 GOALS (+15MIN Q&A)

1. Detail Security Automation Technology & Initiatives

- Security Automation development initiatives (Red Hat + NSA + NIST)
- RHEL7 STIG and DoD Secure Host Baseline Status

2. Live Demos

- Demo #1
 - i. Deploying Directly into STIG Compliance
 - ii. Any other profiles available, like C2S?
 - iii. What C&A paperwork can be automatically generated?
- Demo #2
 - i. Configuration Compliance Scanning (RHEL7 STIG)
 - ii. Customized Compliance baselines with OpenSCAP Workbench
 - iii. Certification/Accreditation Paperwork Generation
- 3. Roadmap Discussion Intermixed (Gov't Plans, Packaging, Future Profiles)



MOTIVATION: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 STIG

- 587 compliance checks
- No published automation, check everything by hand
- Released 1,988 days after RHEL 5.0!

Average time to configure and verify control	# controls	Total time <u>per RHEL instance</u>
1 minute	* 587	9.7 hours
3 minutes	* 587	29.4 hours
5 minutes	* 587	48.9 hours





























Common Criteria tells the government software can be "trusted" Agencies select and refine NIST 800-53 controls they agree with ("NSA secure passwords must be 14 characters, 2 upper, 2 lower")

Technology-specific baseline guidance created (e.g. DoD STIGs for RHEL)

Baseline guidance approved by CxO office (DoD DSAWG)







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DISA Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 STIG

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- Fully automated checking base off SCAP
- Released 932 days after RHEL 6.0!





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5.5 years \rightarrow 2.5 years (55% faster) 587 checks \rightarrow 260 checks (56% smaller)





Moving towards fully automated compliance baselines + "0 day STIGs"





OpenSCAP & SCAP Security Guide

Project: http://openscap.io

Code: http://github.com/OpenSCAP



NORTHROP GRUMMAN

ARL

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce



LOCKHEED MARTIN



ORACLE





OpenSCAP BY THE NUMBERS . . .

- 12,109 commits from 155 contributors across all government sectors *(including system integrators!)*
- 1,967,097 lines of code!
- Averages 10.1 commits per day, releases average every 90 days
 - Average 79.9 code contributions per author
 - Up from average of 13 in 2015!
- Red Hat sponsors NIST Configuration & Compliance certifications <u>https://nvd.nist.gov/SCAP-Validated-Tools/</u>



NEW REQUIREMENTS AROUND SELINUX

Making The World a Safer Place

Background:

- "SELinux is a Linux kernel security module that provides a mechanism for supporting access control security policies, including United States Department of Defense–style mandatory access controls (MAC)." wikipedia
- A type is a way of classifying an application or resource. Type enforcement is the enforcement of access control on that type. All files, processes, network resources, etc on an SELinux system have a label, and one of the components of that label is the "type".
- Much of the kernel work has been done by the NSA and Red Hat

SELinux must be enabled and in enforcing mode - CAT I finding.





WHAT SHOULD I DO WHILE I WAIT FOR DISA TO RELEASE THEIR STIG CONTENT?

STIG

Question: May I deploy a product if no STIG exists?

Answer: Yes, based on mission need and with DAA approval.

Question: What do I use if there is no STIG?

Answer:

DISA FSO developed Security Requirement Guides (SRGs) to address technology areas. In the absence of a STIG, an SRG can be used to determine compliance with DoD policies. If there is no applicable SRG or STIG, industry or vendor recommended practices may be used. Examples include Center for Internet Security Benchmarks, Payment Card Industry requirements or the vendor's own security documentation.

Question:

Does DISA FSO certify products for use in the DoD?

Answer:

No. DISA FSO certifies Information Systems for use in DISA. DISA FSO not does certify products for DoD use. SRGs/STIGs are designed to assist in implementing the secure deployment of products.

http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/faqs.aspx#STIG



DEMO #1: DEPLOYING INTO STIG COMPLIANCE

- How can we deploy directly into STIG compliance?
 - GUI
 - Kickstart
- Any other profiles available, like C2S?
- What C&A paperwork can be automatically generated?



DEMO #2: CONTINUOUS MONITORING

- How do we tailor the baseline, enabling/disabling certain rules?
- How do we refine values, such as password length?
- Is remediation possible?



THANK YOU



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Backup Slides



WHERE ARE SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS:

KICKSTARTS, SCRIPTS, NIST MAPPINGS and OTHER ITEMS

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TAILORING THE BASELINE

SCAP WORKBENCH



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BOTH AT PROVISIONING and FOR CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE



During manual installation

New "security" option in the installer

- Secure RHEL during provisioning
- Specify the profile at installation time
- Supports vendor content and web-based content



BOTH AT PROVISIONING and FOR CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE

5 N			RED HAT ENTERPRISE LI	NUX 7.2 INSTAL
Change content	Apply security policy: CN			
Choose profile below	w:			
Default The implicit XCCDF	profile. Usually, the default contains n	o rules.		
Standard System S This profile contains	ecurity Profile rules to ensure standard security base	of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 sy	stem.	
Draft PCI-DSS v3	Control Baseline for Red Hat Enterpr ofile for PCI-DSS v3	ise Linux 7		
Red Hat Corporate This is a *draft* SC	Profile for Certified Cloud Providen AP profile for Red Hat Certified Cloud	s (RH CCP) Providers		
Common Profile fo This profile contains	r General-Purpose Systems items common to general-purpose de	sktop and server installations.		
		Select profile		
Changes that were o	lone or need to be done:	Select profile		
Changes that were o	lone or need to be done: æd	Select profile		

Supplied Content

RHEL 6

- C2S: Collaboration with CIA and Amazon, derived from CIS
- STIG: Official RHEL6 STIG baseline, derived from OS SRG
- CSCF: Cross domain, derived from CNSSI 1253 CDS Overlay

RHEL 7

- PCI: Commercial baseline for financial services
- STIG: Vendor STIG submission
- OSPP: NIAP and NIST 800-53 derived



BOTH AT PROVISIONING and FOR CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE

```
%addon org_fedora_oscap
content-type = datastream
content-url = http://www.example.com/scap/testing_ds.xml
datastream-id = scap_example.com_datastream_testing
xccdf-id = scap_example.com_cref_xccdf.xml
profile = xccdf_example.com_profile_my_profile
fingerprint = 240f2f18222faa98856c3b4fc50c4195
%end
```

Automated Kickstart configuration

- New %addon section
 - Content location included or web based
 - Profile to apply



BOTH AT PROVISIONING and FOR CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE

RED HAT SATELLITE							Red Hat Access			
Red Hat, Inc. V Monitor V	Content ~ Containers	∽ Hosts ∽ Configure								
Compliance Reports										
compliance reports										
Filter		Q Sea	rch v							
Host		Date	Passed	Failed	Other					
s virt-who.deployment6.lan		20 days ago	34	33		View Report	¥			
s virt-who.deployment6.lan		20 days ago	34	33		View Report	~			
s virt-who.deployment6.lan		20 days ago	34	33	1	View Report	~			
s virt-who.deployment6.lan		20 days ago	34	33		View Report	~			
s virt-who.deployment6.lar RED HAT'S	ATELLITE						Red Hat Access			
s virt-who.deployment6.lar Red Hat,	Inc Monitor - Con		ts ∽ Configure ∽							
s virt-who.deployment6.lar										
s virt-who.deployment6.lar	▼ Account and Access Control 16x fall									
s virt-who.deployment6.lar	v Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login (3x fail)									
Needer to a H B and the	► Restrict Root	▶ Restrict Root Logins								
Displaying all 9 entries	▼ Verify Prope	v Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes (1x fail)								
	Prevent Lo	Prevent Log In to Accounts With Empty Password								
	Verify All A	round Password Hashes are Shadowad				medium	Dass			
	* Set Passwor									
	- Set Fasswor	* Set rassword Expiration ratameters examine								
	ord Minimum Length in login.defs				medium	Tall				
	ord Minimum Age				medium	fail				
	Set Passw	ord Warning Age			low	pass				
	▼ Protect Account	v Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM 10x fail								
	▼ Set Passwor	▼ Set Password Quality Requirements (5x fail)								
	▼ Set Passw	v Set Password Quality Requirements, if using pam_pwquality (5x fail)								
	Set Pas	word Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session			low	pass				
	Set Pas	word Strength Minimum Digit Characters			low	fail				
	Set Pas	sword Strength Minimum Lippers	ase Characters			low	fail			

Satellite Server Integration

- Periodic scans from Satellite
- Run remotely
- Provide results for all RHEL systems within the GUI
- Easily deploy and track compliance



NEW CAT I, II, and III FINDINGS

Click to add subtitle

Insert paragraph of copy here. Do not exceed 40 words.

- . 39x CAT I
- 242x CAT II
- 14x CAT III



DIFFERENCES:

VENDOR SUPPLIED CONTENT vs DISA CONTENT

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