


WE'VE SEEN THIS PANIC BEFORE















The quick brown fox jumps.

over he lazy dog


is named Reynard

The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.

is named Reynard.

is named Reynard.







BARUCH SADDGURSKY - @JBARUCH

- * HEAD OF DEVREL AT TUXCARE I AM HIRING!
- * ABSTRACTION CONNDISSEUR
- * DEVELOPMENT *** DEVOPS ***
 **INTENTINTEGRITYCHAIN















LEDNID IGDLNIK - @LIGDLNIK

- EVP OF ENG AT CLARI- I AM HIRING!
- * ABSTRACTION WRANGLER
- X DEVELOPMENT IN ARCH IN LEADER








SHDWNDTES

- * SPEAKING JBARU CH
- * SLIDES
- * VIDED
- * ALL THE LINKS!





DUESTIONS?





AI-GENERATED CODE IS NOT GREAT



Search Help | /

Computer Science > Software Engineering

based on the proposed code quality metrics.

[Submitted on 21 Apr 2023 (v1), last revised 22 Oct 2023 (this version, v2)]

Evaluating the Code Quality of AI-Assisted Code Generation Tools: An Empirical Study on GitHub Copilot, Amazon CodeWhisperer, and ChatGPT

Burak Yetiştiren, Işık Özsoy, Miray Ayerdem, Eray Tüzün

Context: Al-assisted code generation tools have become increasingly prevalent in software engineering, offering the ability to generate code from natural language prompts or partial code inputs. Notable examples of these tools include GitHub Copilot, Amazon CodeWhisperer, and OpenAl'S ChatGPT.

Objective: This study aims to compare the performance of these prominent code generation tools in terms of code quality metrics, such as Code Validity, Code Correctness, Code Security, Code Reliability, and Code Maintainability, to identify their strengths and shortcomings Method: We assess the code generation capabilities of GitHub Copilot, Amazon CodeWhisperer, and ChatGPT using the benchmark HumanEval Dataset. The generated code is then evaluated

Results: Our analysis reveals the title latest reviews of ChatSPT, Cittle Society, and Amazor CodeWhisperer generate correct code 65.2%, 46.3%, and 31.1% of the time, espectively. In comparison, the newer versions of change confocund amazon codewinspeler showed



DN TOP OF THAT, IT IS DANGEROUS



Search... Help | Adv

@GEECON

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

[Submitted on 20 Aug 2021 (v1), last revised 16 Dec 2021 (this version, v3)]

Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributions

Hammond Pearce, Baleegh Ahmad, Benjamin Tan, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Ramesh Karri

There is burgeoning interest in designing Al-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems, including tools that automatically generate computer code. The most notable of these comes in the form of the first self-described 'Al pair programmer', GitHub Copilot, a language model trained over open-source GitHub code. However, code often contains bugs – and so, given the vast quantity of unvetted code that Copilot has processed, it is certain that the language model will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns on the security of Copilot's code contributions. In this work, we systematically investigate the prevalence and conditions that can cause GitHub Copilot to recommend insecure code. To perform this analysis we prompt Copilot to generate code in scenarios relevant to high-risk CWEs (e.g. those from MITRE's "Top 25" list). We explore Copilot's performance on three distinct code generation axes — examining how it performs given diversity of weaknesses, diversity of prompts, and diversity of domains. In total, we produce 89 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, producing 1,689 programs. Of these, we found



@JBARUCH



approximately 40% to be vulnerable.

ASKING IT TO FIX IT IS AS RELIABLE AS THE REST OF IT



GEECON

Computer Science > Software Engineering

[Submitted on 21 May 2024 (v1), last revised 28 Nov 2024 (this version, v2)]

Fight Fire with Fire: How Much Can We Trust ChatGPT on Source Code-Related Tasks?

Xiao Yu, Lei Liu, Xing Hu, Jacky Wai Keung, Jin Liu, Xin Xia

With the increasing utilization of large language models such as ChatGPT during software development, it has become crucial to verify the quality of code content it generates. Recent studies proposed utilizing ChatGPT as both a developer and tester for multi-agent collaborative software development. The multi-agent collaboration empowers ChatGPT to produce test reports for its generated code, enabling it to self-verify the code content and fix bugs based on these reports. However, these studies did not assess the effectiveness of the generated test reports in validating the code. Therefore, we conduct a comprehensive empirical investigation to evaluate ChatGPT's self-verification capability in code generation, code completion, and program repair. We request ChatGPT to (1) generate correct code and then self-verify its correctness; 2) complete code without vulnerabilities and then selfverify for the presence of vulnerabilities; and (3) repair buggy code and then self-verify whether the bugs are resolved. Dur findings on two code generation datasets, one code completion dataset, and two program repair datasets reveal the following observations: (1) ChatGPT often erroneously predicts its generated incorrect code as correct. (2) The self-contradictory hallucinations in ChatGPT's behavior arise. (3) The self-verification capability of ChatGPT can be enhanced by asking the guiding question, which queries whether ChatGPT agrees with assertions about incorrectly generated or repaired code and vulnerabilities in completed code. (4) Using test reports generated by ChatGPT can identify more vulnerabilities in completed code. but the explanations for incorrectly generated code and failed repairs are mostly inaccurate in the test reports. Based on these findings, we provide














WITHOUT EXPERTISE, YOU GET CHAOS—NOT CODE



EXPERT 10:03







#INTENTINTEGRITYCHAIN



SPEAKING. JBARU. CH






FASTER? SURE. JUST DON'T ASK WHAT IT COST.



CIRCULAR VERIFICATION












SPEAKING.JBARU.CH




HE THOUGHT IT WAS OBVIOUS.


































EXECUTABLE

@JBARUCH @LIGOLNIK

#INTENTINTEGRITYCHAIN

@GEECON



DEVELOPERS ARE BIASED FOR ACTION














TEST-FIRST. WITHOUT TRYING.





DISCIPLINE BECOMES A SIDE EFFECT











SPEAKING, JBARU, CH





THEY DIDN'T REVIEW THE TESTS... **BECAUSE THEY COULDN'T READ THEM**





PRDDUCT MANAGERS











DESCRIBE EXPECTED BEHAVIOR. IN STRUCTURED PLAIN ENGLISH







BDD REQUIRED DISCIPLINE AND SYNTAX







THE OVERHEAD OUTWEIGHED THE BENEFIT



WHO NEEDS GHERKIN WHEN YOU CAN VIBECODE?



Handle payments unless the card is expired... then retry mabe?















READABLE BY HUMANS. EXECUTABLE BY MACHINES.



INTENT INTEGRITY CHAIN



EE PDD BDD TDD





INTENT INTEGRITY CHAIN

- * HUMANS WRITE PROMPT
- * MDNKEYS GENERATE SPEC
- * MACHINE CREATES TESTS
- * MONKEYS WRITE CODE






GEECON



DETERMINISTIC TEST GENERATION

PROMPT

SPEC











TESTS ARE LOCKED
































IT'S NOT ABOUT PROMPTING. IT'S ABOUT ALIGNMENT.



