



#### HTTPS://JAROG.OM/SHOTHS


- JAII THE IIIKS
- JOMMENTS, RATINGS
- RAFFIK!





#### FREENS WENT DIAGRAMS




















- J ) DEVS
- TON PREM BACKEROUND (DEFENCE!)
- SMART PEOPLE
- JIPSTERS!
- JS. NODE, REACTIVE, MICROSERVICES

- TAL TOD, UNIT & INTEGRATION AUTOMATED TESTS
- JOPS SERVERIESS MOOPS

























DATA CENTER

SECURITY

TRANSFORMATION

BUSINESS

PERSONAL TECH

SCIENCE

EMERGENT TECH

BOOTNOTES

#### Software

#### How one developer just broke Node, Babel and thousands of projects in 11 lines of JavaScript

Code pulled from NPM – which everyone was using


By Chris Williams, US editor 23 Mar 2016 at 01:24

SHARE ▼



Careful, careful ... Don't fumble this like the JS world (Credit: Claus Rebler)

**Updated** Programmers were left staring at broken builds and failed installations on Tuesday after someone toppled the Jenga tower of JavaScript.









- TROUND A: 26 DEVELOPERS
  - TI DEVELOPER WITH OPS BACKGROUND
- -100 (USTOMERS
- JSUPPORT TEAM

- JOHU SKRUM
- CAPLORATORY TESTING
- JOPS WE GOT A GUY THAT KNOWS THIS SHOT!
- DEVELOPER ON CALL
- TIOGS AND CLOCKS IN UTC, FOR "SAKE!



















Root Cause Analysis Report				
Environment		What was affected	Onboarding (Apps	
Date RCA Completed	Friday June 17th, 2016 Date issue occurred Wednesday June 15th, 201			
RCA Team Members		Time issue started	ednesday June 15th, 2016 10:04 PM CST	
ReferenceID	DE175504	Time issue stopped	Thursday June 16th, 2016 10:44 PM CST	
Any flowdock references		Total time services affected	24:40 Hours	
EVENTS: describe timeline of events	June 15, 2016 10:04 PM CST finds logging indicating that there are significant issues with hero, others jump into debugging session for hero  June 16, 2016 12:14 AM CST verifies that ServiceNow onboarding still works in staging, identifies log error in production indicating access token could not be retrieved  June 16, 2016 02:55 AM CST - Kron service is stopped in production, resulting in temporary fix of hero issues. It is verified that still fails to onboard.  June 16, 2016 03:24 AM CST - After further debugging of logs an environment by the team, it is determined that the production environment being still configured with global Oauth credentials for the most likely cause. It is decided to continue with verification in the morning.  June 16, 2016 11:48 AM CST - are able to verify in a local development environment that defined global oauth credentials is the issue and debugged hero to find root defect, which gets opened separately  June 16, 2016 10:44 PM CST - production is redeployed without global oauth credentials for configured, resolving the issue			

SYMPT describe the		Onboarding on production never succeeded. Test connection calls for always failed and returned with a 403 response (after temporarily resolving Hero issues that would result in occasional 500s). Hero logs indicate that there was an error acquiring the ss token and that the User was not authenticated, despite using credentials that worked on other unaffected environments.
	<b>HAPPENED:</b> scription of events	Smoke testing was happening in production after a hotfix deployment to fix certain kinds of data. While I was able to verify this on staging, I could not even get past the ServiceNow add page because it could not properly authorize the connection, despite using credentials that allowed for successful onboarding in other environments.  At the same time, we were discovering significant issues with hero performance that resulted in more than occasional hero tasks failing to respond properly, resulting in failures with a different error code. After investigation of those issues and a temporary fix implemented via shutting down of Kron, the consistently with authentication errors.  After theorizing that the tenant credentials were not actually being used to perform the auth, and discovered that there were global auth credentials for still configured in production environment, where the staging environment had no such configs. As that was believed to be the only significant difference between the two environments, we believed that the global auth keys were still being used.  After verifying this in a development environment the next morning, the production environment was redeployed later that evening with the hotfix for hero and the global auth tokens for removed from configuration. This resolved the

ROOT CAUSE:	The short term effective cause was that the production environment was configured with global tokens from the past that did not get cleared out when no longer needed and were no longer valid. However, the syncer config and hero code is supposed to be set up to explicitly ignore global oauth configs, but a bug in hero still gave those configs precedence. A separate defect was filed for the hero bug.
NEXT STEPS:  what actions can be taken to eliminate	<ol> <li>Fix the hero defect causing global oauth keys to always take precedence, even when configured not to [https://rally1.rallydev.com/</li> <li>Make an official process for which code changes that require config changes are specially noted and marked such that those configuration changes are also done in the staging and production environments before deployment</li> </ol>









So, what happened yesterday? Here's what went wrong and what we're doing to fix it:



#### GitLab.com Database Incident

Yesterday we had a serious incident with one of our databases. We lost six hours of database data (issues, merge requests, users, comments, snippets, etc.) for GitLa...

about.gitlab.com

RETWEETS

LIKES 358









5:05 AM - 1 Feb 2017












#### **Problems Encountered**

- LVM snapshots are by default only taken once every 24 hours. *Team-member-1* happened to run one manually about six hours prior to the outage because he was working in load balancing for the database.
- Regular backups seem to also only be taken once per 24 hours, though team-member-1 has not yet been able to figure out where they are stored. According to team-member-2 these don't appear to be working, producing files only a few bytes in size.
- Team-member-3: It looks like pg\_dump may be failing because PostgreSQL 9.2 binaries are being run instead of 9.6 binaries. This happens because omnibus only uses Pg 9.6 if data/PG\_VERSION is set to 9.6, but on workers this file does not exist. As a result it defaults to 9.2, failing silently. No SQL dumps were made as a result. Fog gem may have cleaned out older backups.
- Disk snapshots in Azure are enabled for the NFS server, but not for the DB servers.
- The synchronisation process removes webhooks once it has synchronised data to staging. Unless we can pull these from a regular backup from the past 24 hours they will be lost
- The replication procedure is super fragile, prone to error, relies on a handful of random shell scripts, and is badly documented
- Our backups to S3 apparently don't work either: the bucket is empty
- So in other words, out of five backup/replication techniques deployed none are working reliably or set up in the first place. We ended up restoring a six-hour-old backup.
- pg\_basebackup will silently wait for a master to initiate the replication progress, according to another
  production engineer this can take up to 10 minutes. This can lead to one thinking the process is stuck
  somehow. Running the process using "strace" provided no useful information about what might be going on.





Follow



#JeSuisTeamMember1 #GitLab

11:31 AM - 1 Feb 2017






Gift from Google



Gift from Codefresh

Yes, *team-member-1* is doing very well!

Coincidentally, just before the DB incident, *team-member-1* had qualified for a promotion to senior developer. The outage did not change that decision.



#### Yorick Peterse

@yorickpeterse · Member since August 4, 2015

yorickpeterse@gmail.com · ☑ · yorickpeterse.com · ♥ The Netherlands · ➡ GitLab

Database (removal) Specialist at GitLab





- -ROUND B: 74 D&VS
  - 55 DEV WITH OPS BG
  - JI PERFORMANCE ENG
- OWER ARCHITECT

- JUSTOMER SUCCESS TEAM

- -1000 (USTOMERS

- JOHU SAFK
- SYSTEM TESTING
- JOPS OPS TEAM (WATE!)
- SCALATION PATH: SME AND MANAGER ON CALL
- TORFUNCTIONAL BACKLOG





JIRA + Confluence

GitHub

Configuration Management

Travis CI

JFrog Artifactory AWS Beanstalk


Sumologic

**APM** 



On your promotion.

### ACTION































- TREFORMANCE AND SCALABILITY TESTING
- TIKERSE AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT
- PROACTIVE PERFORMANCE AND TRENDS REVIEW
- INON-FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF DONE AND ESTABLISHED PATTERNS






#### **Engineering effort allocation**



- Improve Eng. Velocity
- Decrease Customer MTTR
- Reduce TCO
- Big Feature A
- Fulfull customer and field commitments
- Keep the lights on
- Corporate Initiatives
- Quality Improvements
- Uncategorized + Research for Future Releases




### Q1FY15 Customer Defects by Severity



281 – Total Q1FY15 Customer Defects(escalated by Support to Engineering)

182 (65%) – S1 & S2 Tickets


### Q1FY15 Customer defects by Resolution



56 (19.9%) defects—Resolution = Code Fix 147 (52.3%) defects—Resolution = Information Provided







Change!

Technology

OWN BILLD IT YOU





People IS THE MEY!

### CEAMO TIMER ADS

- OBARUCII
- \*#TK(IISTRONG
- THTTPS://JFROG.COM/SHOWNOTKS