You secured your code dependencies, is that enough?

Anant Shrivastava

Anant Shrivastava

- Chief researcher @ Cyfinoid Research (Research Powered Trainings)
- 17+ yrs of corporate exposure
- **Speaker / Trainer:** BH/DC, c0c0n, nullcon, RootConf, RuxCon
- **Project Lead:**
  - Code Vigilant (Code Review Project)
  - Hacking Archives of India,
  - TamerPlatform (Android Security)

- (@anantshri on social platforms) https://anantshri.info

Question : Have you heard about

SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

SBOM (SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIAL)

SOURCE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS TOOLS

Why?

Incidences

- SolarWind
- CodeCov
- Colonial Pipeline

Resultant

- EO by US President

MAY 12, 2021

Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

BRIEFING ROOM ▸ PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people's security and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, and respond to these actions and actors. The Federal Government must also carefully examine what occurred during any major cyber incident and apply lessons learned. But cybersecurity requires more than government action. Protecting our Nation from malicious cyber actors requires the Federal Government to partner with the private sector. The private sector must adapt to the continuously changing threat environment,

Supply Chain issues are age old trust issues

Ken Thompson talk about Supply Chain security and inherent trust in 1983.

During the lecture, Ken outlines a three-step process for altering a C compiler binary to implant a backdoor when compiling the "login" program, all without leaving any evidence in the source code.

He got the idea from an older US MIL document published in 1974 titled “MULTICS SECURITY EVALUATION”



TURING AWARD LECTURE

Reflections on Trusting Trust

To what extent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses? Perhaps it is more important to trust the people who wrote the software.

KEN THOMPSON

INTRODUCTION

I thank the ACM for this award. I can't help but feel that I am receiving this honor for timing and serendipity as much as technical merit. UNIX[1] swept into popularity with an industry-wide change from central mainframes to autonomous minis. I suspect that Daniel Bobrow [1] would be here instead of me if he could not afford a PDP-10 and had had to "settle" for a PDP-11. Moreover, the current state of UNIX is the result of the labors of a large number of people.

There is an old adage, "Dance with the one that brought you," which means that I should talk about UNIX. I have not worked on mainstream UNIX in many years, yet I continue to get undeserved credit for the work of others. Therefore, I am not going to talk about UNIX, but I want to thank everyone who has contributed.

That brings me to Dennis Ritchie. Our collaboration has been a thing of beauty. In the ten years that we have worked together, I can recall only one case of miscoordination of work. On that occasion, I discovered that we both had written the same 20-line assembly language program. I compared the sources and was astounded to find that they matched character-for-character. The result of our work together has been far greater than the work that we each contributed.

I am a programmer. On my 1040 form, that is what I

programs. I would like to present to you the cutest program I ever wrote. I will do this in three stages and try to bring it together at the end.

STAGE I

In college, before video games, we would amuse ourselves by posing programming exercises. One of the favorites was to write the shortest self-reproducing program. Since this is an exercise divorced from reality, the usual vehicle was FORTRAN. Actually, FORTRAN was the language of choice for the same reason that three-legged races are popular.

More precisely stated, the problem is to write a source program that, when compiled and executed, will produce as output an exact copy of its source. If you have never done this, I urge you to try it on your own. The discovery of how to do it is a revelation that far surpasses any benefit obtained by being told how to do it. The part about "shortest" was just an incentive to demonstrate skill and determine a winner.

Figure 1 shows a self-reproducing program in the C[3] programming language. (The purist will note that the program is not precisely a self-reproducing program, but will produce a self-reproducing program.) This entry is much too large to win a prize, but it demonstrates the technique and has two important properties that I need to complete my story: 1) This program can be

Ref-

- https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf
- https://research.swtch.com/nih
- https://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/history/papers/karg74.pdf

…and it’s not going anywhere anytime soon…

In a report by European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA), they state Supply Chain Compromise of Software Dependencies as one of the threats that gonna be at peak.

Ref - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-foresight-cybersecurity-threats-for-2030

enisa

IDENTIFYING EMERGING CYBER SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES FOR 2030
March 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Effect across the globe in Govt

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5374
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/11/business/japan-passes-economic-security-bill-protect-sensitive-technology/
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-10460/p-54
https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/SBOM_Guidelines.pdf

Why now?

- Software build automation == quicker release cycle
- Automated release cycle == less wait for features
- Faster feature release == less inclination to upgrade dependencies
- Too much focus on OSS Codebase without helping the maintainers
- Impossible segregation of features and bug fixes
- Automated notification of vulnerability (hedonic hamster wheel)

Work done by Dependabot in last ~5 months

Start of Feb 2025



End of June 2025



2451693 issues closed
120751 new issues created

What is Software Bill of Material

Itemized list of all the ***ingredients*** in the software

Ingredients ~ third-party components

SBoM's are mostly for one level depth only with other levels plugged in each other.

https://www.ntia.gov/report/2021/minimum-elements-software-bill-materials-sbom

SCA Source Composition Analysis Tools



Question : Raise your hands if

You have SCA tooling in your organization?



You follow vulnerability management practices for source code components?

Let the fun begin



Software Supply Chains beyond Code chain

- We have focused too much on Software code itself
- As consumers we are dealing with too many chain not in awareness
- As a Company there are dependency chains far beyond code dependencies

What other chains?

Any Software or application which allows 3rd party to add or modify functionality

- pluggable modules / plugins
- Extensions
- Theming customizations

A set of chain that existed 5 months back

A developer uses a **Chrome extension** to manipulate AI prompts, which are then fed into **Visual Studio Code** through a set of AI-driven code completion **extensions**. The resulting code is committed to **GitHub**, where a set of **GitHub Actions** automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a **Docker image**, deployed on **Kubernetes**, running inside an **EC2 instance**, built from a specific **AMI**.

A Chain that exists now (besides previous)

A developer uses an **autonomous AI agent** to write code by providing them a one liner prompt and **full access to the commandline**. The resulting code is committed to **GitHub**, where a set of **GitHub Actions** automatically run analysis and tests. The code is then containerized into a **Docker image**, deployed on **Kubernetes**, running inside an **EC2 instance**, built from a specific **AMI**.

Simplified Supply Chain view



Why do they matter

PRODUCTION IS HARDENED, DEV NOT SO MUCH

EASIER TO COMPROMISE LESS GUARDED PATHS

SMALLER ORGS EASIER TO INFILTRATE / OCCUPY / ACQUIRE

Developer Machine : Why lucrative

Lots of credentials and access

Developers require a bit of lax security to get job done

Exceptions in network policy rules

Mostly will have admin access



Multiple powerful apps (IDE, debugger etc)

Show me data don’t just imagine

Case studies: WYS Is not WYG

Content delivered differently to curl and browser :

Don’t curl | sh

https://jordaneldredge.com/blog/one-way-curl-pipe-sh-install-scripts-can-be-dangerous/

Don’t pipe to shell

https://www.seancassidy.me/dont-pipe-to-your-shell.html

curl https://anantshri.info/fun/legitimate.sh | bash

```
location ~ ^/fun/legitimate.sh$ {
     if ($http_user_agent ~* "(MSIE|Trident|Edge|Chrome|Firefox)"){
             rewrite ^ /fun/legitimate.sh break;
     }
     rewrite ^ /fun/evil.sh break;
}
```



Chrome Browser

- By Google (claimed as fastest)
- Installer runs without admin privilege

(you can cancel admin prompts)

- https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/01/dozens-of-backdoored-chrome-extensions-discovered-on-2-6-million-devices/

What can a browser extension do

SSH Agent for Google Chrome™

4.6 ★ (12)

Provides an SSH Agent implementation for Chrome's Secure Shell extension

HTML5FS File Editor

3.2 ★ (9 ratings)

Extension | Developer Tools | 267 users



Cookie Monster

Malicious EditThisCookie Extension Attacking Chrome Users to Steal Data

Chrome | Cyber Security News

PUBLISHED ON **JANUARY 6, 2025** | BY **DIVYA**

The popular cookie management extension EditThisCookie has been the target of a malicious impersonation. Originally a trusted tool for Chrome users, EditThisCookie allowed users to manage cookie data in their browsers.

- https://gbhackers.com/malicious-editthiscookie-extension/

Visual Studio Code

- Too many examples to count



- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-vscode-extensions-with-millions-of-installs-discovered/

Visual Studio Marketplaces

- VS Code extensions marketplace is only usable by MS Products
- https://open-vsx.org "Extensions for VS Code Compatible Editors"

- Just **over 8 million developers depend on Open VSX** across dozens of VS Code based editors including Cursor, Windsurf, Google Cloud Shell Editor, and Gitlab Web IDE

- Exploiting a CI issue a malicious actor could publish malicious updates to **every extension** on Open VSX

- Ref: https://blog.koi.security/marketplace-takeover-how-we-couldve-taken-over-every-developer-using-a-vscode-fork-f0f8cf104d44

Homebrew

- Google ads to bring traffic
- Near replica of website
- Serving install.sh with fake admin password prompt



https://x.com/ryanchenkie/status/1880730173634699393

Unexpected places for code execution

How to execute a script at %pre, %post, %preun or %postun stage (spec file) while installing/upgrading an rpm

May 13, 2018 by golinuxhub

RPM spec files have several sections which allow packages to run code on installation and removal. These bits of code are called scriptlets and are mostly used to update the running system with information from the package.

When scriptlets are called, they will be supplied with an argument. This argument, accessed via **$1** (for shell scripts) is the number of packages of this name which will be left on the system when the action completes

All scriptlets MUST exit with the zero exit status.

NAME

sources.list - List of configured APT data sources

DESCRIPTION

The source list /etc/apt/sources.list and the files contained in /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ are designed to support any number of active sources and a variety of source media. The files list one source per line (one-line style) or contain multiline stanzas defining one or more sources per stanza (deb822 style), with the most preferred source listed first (in case a single version is available from more than one source). The information available from the configured sources is acquired by apt-get update (or by an equivalent command from another APT front-end).

https://manpages.debian.org/bookworm/apt/sources.list.5.en.html
https://www.golinuxhub.com/2018/05/how-to-execute-script-at-pre-post-preun-postun-spec-file-rpm/

Unexpected places or code execution



https://github.blog/2022-10-18-git-security-vulnerabilities-announced/

Blog Engineering Product Security Open Source Enterprise More Try GitHub

Upgrade to the latest Git version

The most effective way to protect against these vulnerabilities is to upgrade to Git 2.38.1. If you can't update immediately, reduce your risk by taking the following steps:

- Avoid running `git shell`, or disable its interactive mode with `rm -fr $HOME/git-shell-commands` if doing so is impractical.
- Avoid running `git clone` with `--recurse-submodules` against untrusted repositories.
  If submodules are required by your workflow and you cannot upgrade, clone embedded submodules only after inspecting their contents to ensure they do not contain symbolic links in their `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.

  Crucially, clone submodules iteratively rather than recursively by running `git submodule update` at each layer of your repository's submodule chain.

Scripting in Postman

Postman's runtime is based on Node.js and lets you add dynamic behavior to requests and collections. You can use pre-request and test scripts to write API tests, build requests that can contain dynamic parameters, pass data between requests, and more.

Contents

Scripts in Postman

You can add JavaScript code to execute during two events in the flow:

1. Before a request is sent to the server, as a pre-request script under the **Pre-request Script** tab.
2. After a response is received, as a test script under the **Tests** tab.

Postman will prompt you with suggestions as you enter text. Select one to autocomplete your code.

Notepad++

Hackers Hijacked Notepad++ Plugin To Inject Malicious Code

By **Guru Baran** - April 6, 2024

Malicious notepad++ package

autoCompletion	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
functionList	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
localization	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
plugins	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
themes	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
updater	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
userDefineLangs	4/1/2024 6:37 PM	File folder	
certificate.pem	2/22/2024 8:44 AM	PEM File	127 KB
change.log	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	Text Document	1 KB
config.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	8 KB
contextMenu.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	5 KB
contextModel.html	10/18/2023 8:11 PM	Microsoft Edge H...	2,694 KB
doLocalConf.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	0 KB
langs.model.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	452 KB
langs.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	452 KB
langsMod.html	2/20/2024 12:09 PM	Microsoft Edge H...	647 KB
license.txt	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	Text Document	35 KB
notepad.exe	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	Application	7,064 KB
nppLogNulContentCorruptionIssue.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	0 KB
readme.txt	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	Text Document	2 KB
session.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	1 KB
shortcuts.xml	2/19/2024 12:21 PM	XML Document	4 KB

CISA Warns of Trimble Cityworks RCE Vulnerability Exploited to Hack IIS...

Guru Baran - February 8, 2025

The CISA has issued a warning regarding a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Trimble Cityworks, a popular software solution for local government...

https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-hijacked-notepad-plugin/

Notepad ++ Impersonation



Some users have mistakenly believed that `https://notepad.plus/` is the official Notepad++ website. This confusion has led to frustration and potential security risks.

Despite declaring itself an "*unofficial fan website created for general information/educational purposes only*", this site harbors a hidden agenda. It is riddled with malicious advertisements on every page. These advertisements aim to deceive unsuspecting Notepad++ users into clicking on them, generating profits for the site owners.

The true purpose of `https://notepad.plus/` becomes evident when we recognize that it seeks to divert traffic away from the legitimate Notepad++ website, notepad-plus-plus.org. By doing so, it compromises user safety and undermines the integrity of our community.

- https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/help-to-take-down-parasite-site/

Cursor oh Cursor





Rulefiles

- Remember those CTF's where flag was hidden in whitespaces
- Just that but dangerous



https://www.pillar.security/blog/new-vulnerability-in-github-copilot-and-cursor-how-hackers-can-weaponize-code-agents

C.I. / C.D. Systems

- Not just automation
- Watch over the entire build or deployment practices
- Essential Watchers in the current landscape





https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/28/2003249466/-1/-1/0/CSI_DEFENDING_CI_CD_ENVIRONMENTS.PDF

Global TeamCity Exploitation Opens Door to SolarWinds-Style Nightmare

Russia's APT29 is going after a critical RCE flaw in the JetBrains TeamCity software developer platform, prompting governments worldwide to issue an urgent warning to patch.

Tara Seals, Managing Editor, News, Dark Reading

December 14, 2023

4 Min Read

https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/global-teamcity-exploitation-opens-door-to-solarwinds-style-nightmare

Container Images

- Don’t install software
- Download containers
- Docker (ish) options needed

Alessandro Mascellino
Freelance Journalist
Email Alessandro Follow @a_mascellino

https://blog.aquasec.com/supply-chain-threats-using-container-i...

Two of the container images – openjdk and golang – used misleading titles that suggest they are official container images from OpenJDK and Golang, respectively. They are designed so that a user who is unfocused or in a hurry might mistake them as official container images, even though the Docker Hub accounts responsible for them are not official accounts. Once they are running, they may look like an innocent container. After running, the binary xmrig is executed (MD5: 16572572588c2e241225ea2bf6807eff), which hijacks resources for cryptocurrency mining.

nalware campaigns have infiltrated
ying millions of malicious
ners.

om JFrog’s security research team,
ealed a concerning trend within
Docker Hub

https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/malicious-containers-found-docker/
https://blog.aquasec.com/supply-chain-threats-using-container-images

Dependency Caching Servers

https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-package-exploits-go-module-proxy-caching-for-persistence

Bait and Switch

Package created with a good intent but later abused

Wordpress free plugin purchased and backdoored

- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/backdoor-found-in-wordpress-plugin-with-more-than-300-000-installations/

Rogue Maintainers

peacenotwar module sabotages npm developers in the node-ipc package to protest the invasion of Ukraine - Overwrite all files with ❤️ if origin is Russia or Belarus.

Malware Civil War - 25 malicious packages in npm, with some posing as "colors.js," and even an instance of malware authors targeting each other through a package called "lemaaa" designed to manipulate Discord accounts.

Open source developer corrupts widely-used libraries, affecting tons of projects - For packages color.js and faker.js, the maintainer pushed a corrupt update that triggers an infinite loop of weird characters.

So, what's the plan?

- **A - Awareness**: Identify and move unknown risks into known risks.
- **T - Trust But Verify**: Every dependency, tool, and service should be validated.
- **O - Ongoing Monitoring**: Continuous security checks to detect changes & anomalies.
- **M - Measure & Map**: Build capabilities to **answer real questions** (e.g., how many machines have Chrome installed? How many plugins exist in GitHub workflows?).

Next Steps

No matter how hard I try I will not be able to cover the full breadth

Chrome Extension Auditing



https://www.extensionauditor.com/

End Point Visibility

https://www.osquery.io/

```
SELECT *
FROM chrome_extensions
WHERE chrome_extensions.uid IN (SELECT uid FROM users)
AND (permissions LIKE ('%clipboardWrite%')
OR permissions LIKE ('%<all_urls>%')
OR permissions LIKE ('%tabs%')
OR permissions LIKE ('%cookies%')
OR permissions like ('%://*/%'))
```

Ref: https://medium.com/quiq-blog/detecting-high-risk-chrome-extensions-with-osquery-bca1a8856448

GitHub and Github Actions

Basic Common Sense

- Signed Commit
- Protected Branches
- Force reviews for pull request approval
- Force signed commits

GitHub and Github Actions

Tooling

- https://github.com/Legit-Labs/legitify
- https://best.openssf.org/SCM-BestPractices/
- Implement allstar to enforce secure baselines in the organization.
- https://docs.zizmor.sh

Consumer : Vetting Process needed (Vet)



https://docs.safedep.io/

Consumer : Vetting Process Needed (Overlay)

Overlay is a browser extension that helps developers evaluate open source packages before picking them. It gathers data from various sources, such as Snyk Advisor, Debricked, Socket.dev, and Deps.dev, and displays them on the package pages of popular registries like npm, PyPI, and Go.



Install - https://github.com/os-scar/overlay#installation

Ref - https://checkmarx.com/blog/software-supply-chain-security-leaders-collaborate-and-build-browser-extension-to-help-developers-choose-open-source/

Cloud Auditing

- ScoutSuite: https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite
- Prowlet: https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler
- Kube-hunter: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter
- Kube-bench: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench
- KubiScan: https://github.com/cyberark/KubiScan
- Kubeaudit: https://github.com/Shopify/kubeaudit
- Trivy: https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy
- Cosign: Provenance : https://github.com/sigstore/cosign

Broad Visualization of Software Supply Chain



https://github.com/SecureStackCo/visualizing-software-supply-chain?tab=readme-ov-file

Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts



https://slsa.dev/

OWASP SCVS ~ SSDF

Practices	Tasks	Notional Implementation Examples	References
Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	**PO.1.1**: Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Example 1: Define policies for securing software development infrastructures and their components, including development endpoints, throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security. Example 2: Define policies for securing software development processes throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security, including for open-source and other third-party software components utilized by software being developed. Example 3: Review and update security requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources, or a major security incident targeting software development infrastructure has occurred. Example 4: Educate affected individuals on impending changes to requirements.	**BSAFSS**: SM.3, DE.1, IA.1, IA.2 **BSIMM**: CP1.1, CP1.3, SR1.1, SR2.2, SE1.2, SE2.6 **EO14028**: 4e(ix) **IEC62443**: SM-7, SM-9 **NISTCSF**: ID.GV-3 **OWASPASVS**: 1.1.1 **OWASPMASVS**: 1.10 **OWASPSAMM**: PC1-A, PC1-B, PC2-A **PCISSLC**: 2.1, 2.2 **SCFPSSD**: Planning the Implementation and Deployment of Secure Development Practices **SP80053**: SA-1, SA-8, SA-15, SR-3 **SP800160**: 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3 **SP800161**: SA-1, SA-8, SA-15, SR-3 **SP800181**: T0414; K0003, K0039, K0044, K0157, K0168, K0177, K0211, K0260, K0261, K0262, K0524; S0010, S0357, S0368; A0033, A0123, A0151
	PO.1.2: Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and	Example 1: Define policies that specify risk-based software architecture and design requirements, such as making code modular to facilitate code reuse and updates; isolating security components from other components	**BSAFSS**: SC.1-1, SC.2, PD.1-1, PD.1-2, PD.1-3, PD.2-2, SI, PA, CS, AA, LO, EE **BSIMM**: SM1.1, SM1.4, SM2.2, CP1.1, CP1.2, CP1.3, CP2.1, CP2.3, AM1.2, SFD1.1, SFD2.1, SFD3.2, SR1.1, SR1.3, SR2.2, SR3.3, SR3.4

- https://scvs.owasp.org/
- https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/ssdf

Open Software Supply Chain Attack Reference



https://pbom.dev/

Can of worms that I have not touched



Thanks for listening & open to Questions?