

The Art of Executing Javascript

About

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Agenda

- Introduction - XSS
- Types of XSS and different context
- Same Origin Policy
- Content Security Policy
- XSS via Angular JS

Introduction



Attack with a wrong name ?

Introduction

- Still exists after **18 years** !
- NO.7 in OWASP top 10 2017
- Most commonly reported security vulnerability

Introduction - Impact

- Stealing user cookies
- Keylogger
- Deface website
- Redirect users

Types of XSS

- Reflected XSS
- Stored XSS
- DOM based XSS

Different Context

- HTML
- Attribute
- Script
- Style
- Url

Different Context -html context

- User input comes inside HTML elements
 - `<p>Injection</p>`
- POC
 - `<script>alert(1)</script>`



Different Context -attribute context

- User input comes inside HTML attributes
 - `<p class = " Injection "> </p>`
 - `<p Injection = " test123 "> </p>`
- POC
 - `" onload=alert(1)//`
 - `onload=alert(1)//`

Different Context -script context

- User input comes inside `<script>` tags
 - `<script> var a = ' Injection ' ; </script>`
- POC
 - `' ;alert(1);//`

Different Context -style context

- User input comes inside `<script>` tags
 - `<p style " color: injection " > </p>`
- POC
 - `expression(alert(1));`



Different Context -url context

- User input comes inside `<script>` tags
 - ` click `
- POC
 - `javascript:alert(1)`




SOP

- Scripts on a page can make HTTP **request** and process **responses** between hosts that has the same:

Protocol, Hostname, Port

- An **IFRAME** loaded cannot **read** or **write** data into the page unless it's in the same origin !

SOP



CSP

- Introduced as a mechanism to mitigate code injection
- Directives defines:
 - From **where** and **what** content is allowed to load
 - In **which** context the content is allowed to execute
- It's a mitigation **not first line of defense!**

CSP - Directives

- Directives:
 - default-src
 - script-src
 - object-src
 - style-src
 - image-src
 - frame-src

CSP - Keywords

- Keywords:
 - '*'
 - 'none'
 - 'self'
 - 'unsafe-inline'
 - 'unsafe-eval'

CSP

➤ HTTP Headers

- `<?php header('Content-Security-Policy: default-src https://cdn.example.net; child-src 'none'; object-src 'none'');?>`

➤ Meta tag in HTML

- `<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src https://cdn.example.net; child-src 'none'; object-src 'none'">`

CSP - Common mistakes

- **unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, data:**
 - whole purpose of CSP is defeated
- Eg: `default-src: 'self';script-src: 'unsafe-inline'`
 - Bypass : `<script>alert(1)</script>`

CSP - Common mistakes

- Nonces:
 - Nonce must be a random string
 - Should not be reused
 - Should not be guessable

CSP - Common mistakes

- Examples of bad nonce
 - Request 1- `D29162F1B99108DDA2406C697FFAC27586F42C7D021669F01F720CEEACBB06F5`
 - Request 2- `D29162F1B99108DDA2406C697FFAC27586F42C7D021669F01F720CEEACBB06F5`
 - `e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e` - md5(123456)
 - `1231441`

Demo



CSP - bypass

CSP Bypass

XSS via Angular JS

Escaping the expression sandbox for XSS

Thanks

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