

DefenseNews

A GANNETT COMPANY

Shut Down the Hackers


Presented with



50 MINUTES, 3 GOALS (+10MIN Q&A)


1. Discuss existing & emerging technologies for continuous monitoring
 - Vulnerability Management
 - Configuration Management
2. Share DoD Centralized Super Computing Facility story
3. Data standardization technologies

Consequences of
Operational
Glitches




*Reliance on
Technology over
Time*

Consequences of
Operational
Glitches



Reliance on
Technology over
Time

Consequences of
Operational
Glitches



Reliance on
Technology over
Time

Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity



Biplane: 0 LOC

FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY

OPERATIONAL RISK

Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity



Biplane: 0 LOC



Lunar Module: 2K LOC

FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY

OPERATIONAL RISK

Ever-Increasing Capability & Complexity



Biplane: 0 LOC



Lunar Module: 2K LOC



F-35: 9.9M LOC

FUNCTIONALITY & COMPLEXITY

OPERATIONAL RISK



The Associated Press ✓
@AP



Following

Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured

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1,849


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82

FAVORITES



1:07 PM - 23 Apr 13



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The Washington Post

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Syrian hackers claim AP hack that tipped stock market by \$136 billion. Is it terrorism?



A



2

By Max Fisher April 23, 2013

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Country Reports on Terrorism 2013

April 2014

United States Department of State Publication
Bureau of Counterterrorism
Released April 2014

Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the "Act"), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.


<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf>

"In April 2013, AQI's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the group was operating in Syria and changed its public name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL)."

"On April 30, the U.S. State Department noted that private donations from Persian Gulf countries were "a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly...in Syria," calling the problem one of the most important counterterrorism issues during the previous calendar year. Groups such as al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), previously known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, are believed to be frequent recipients of some of the hundreds of millions of dollars that wealthy citizens and others in the Gulf peninsula have been donating during the Syrian conflict."

2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey


What percent of Electronic Crime events are known or suspected to have been caused by ...



Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine
(sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)

2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey


Which Electronic Crimes were more costly or damaging to your organization, those perpetrated by ...



Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine
(sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)

2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey


How Intrusions Are Handled



Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine
(sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)

2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey


How Intrusions Are Handled





Top 5 Reasons Cyber Crimes were not referred for legal action


Damage level insufficient to warrant prosecution	34%
Lack of evidence/not enough information to prosecute	36%
Could not identify the individuals responsible	37%
Negative publicity	12%
Don't know	21%


Source: 2014 US State of Cybercrime Survey, CSO Magazine
(sponsored by Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Price Waterhouse Cooper, April 2014)
















Case Study:
U.S. Department of Defense
Centralized Super Computing Facility





"Innovation Programs" – Review of ongoing work with
NSA's Information Assurance Directorate and NIST



UNIFIED SYSTEMS

create efficiency



PORTABLE WORKLOADS

create flexibility



OPEN STANDARDS

ensure your organization
is future-proof

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Technology
Information Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations, and the Census, House
Committee on Government Reform

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Wednesday, September 10, 2003

INFORMATION SECURITY

Effective Patch Management is Critical to Mitigating Software Vulnerabilities

Statement of Robert F. Dacey
Director, Information Security Issues

“80% of attacks leverage
known vulnerabilities
and configuration
management setting
weaknesses”

<http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110329.pdf>

UNIFIED SYSTEMS

- LOWERING RISK
 - Correcting “tunnel vision”
 -
 -
 -
- -
 -
 -

UNIFIED SYSTEMS

- LOWERING RISK
 - Correcting “tunnel vision”
 - Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action
 -
 -
- -
 -
 -

UNIFIED SYSTEMS

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 - Daily risk calculations/priorities
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- -
 -
 -

UNIFIED SYSTEMS

- LOWERING RISK
 - Correcting “tunnel vision”
 - Using math and statistics to accelerate corrective action
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 - Automated business processes (patch distribution, corrective actions, etc)
- ... WHILE NOT CHANGING
 - Structure of departments or agencies
 - Decentralized technology management
 - Structure of security program

UNIFIED SYSTEMS

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- ... WHILE NOT CHANGING

- Structure of departments or agencies
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OBSTACLE:

CxO's accountable
for IT security

BUT

Directly supervise only a
small % of systems in use



Framework:

- 1. Scan every 36-72 hours**
2. Focus on Attack Readiness
- 3. Find & Fix Top Issues Daily**
4. Personal results graded
- 5. Hold managers responsible**

An SCAP Primer

- Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)

An SCAP Primer

- Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)
- Defines standardized formats
 - Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query)
 - Standardized outputs (machine readable results)
- *NIST 800-117: Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol*
- *NIST 800-126: The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol*
- *NIST IR 7511: Requirements for vendors to attain NIST Validation*

An SCAP Primer

- Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)
- Defines standardized formats
 - Standardized inputs (e.g. a compliance baseline, status query)
 - Standardized outputs (machine readable results)
- Provides the DoD enterprise with *liberty* with regard to product choices
 - Avoids vendor lock-in, enables interoperability
 - Provides common technical position to vendors, integrators, mission partners
 - Federal procurement language requires SCAP support in some cases (e.g. new Common Criteria language)

SCAP Security Guide

<https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide>



Contributors include ...



DefenseNews

Live Demo

SCAP Security Guide

- ~1.66M lines of code from 80 developers across DoD, IC, Civilian, industry, academia
- NIST Validated tooling (OpenSCAP)
- Upstream for US Gov Enterprise Linux baselines
 - STIG: DoD RHEL6 baseline, produced by DISA FSO
 - C2S: Intelligence Community “Commercial Cloud” for JWICS
 - CSCF: NRO’s Centralized Super Computing Facility (CNSSI 1253 controls)
 - CS2: NSA RHEL6 baseline
 - US Navy JBoss EAP
- Shipping *natively* in Enterprise Linux

2.4.2. Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM

2.4.2.a. Set Last Logon/Access Notification

2.4.2.2. Set Password Quality Requirements

2.4.2.2.1. Set Password Quality Requirements, if using pam_cracklib

2.4.2.2.1.a. Set Password Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session

2.4.2.2.1.b. Set Password to Maximum of Three Consecutive Repeating Characters

2.4.2.2.1.c. Set Password Strength Minimum Digit Characters

2.4.2.2.1.d. Set Password Strength Minimum Uppercase Characters

2.4.2.2.1.e. Set Password Strength Minimum Special Characters

2.4.2.2.1.f. Set Password Strength Minimum Lowercase Characters

2.4.2.2.1.g. Set Password Strength Minimum Different Characters

2.4.2.2.1.h. Set Password Strength Minimum Different Categories

2.4.2.3. Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts

2.4.2.3.a. Set Deny For Failed Password Attempts

2.4.2.3.b. Set Lockout Time For Failed Password Attempts

2.4.2.3.c. Set Interval For Counting Failed Password Attempts

2.4.2.3.d. Limit Password Reuse

2.4.2.4.b. Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs

In `/etc/login.defs`, add or correct the following line to ensure the system will use SHA-512 as the hashing algorithm:

```
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
```

Using a stronger hashing algorithm makes password cracking attacks more difficult.

Remediation script

```
if grep --silent ^ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs ; then
sed -i 's/^ENCRYPT_METHOD.*ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512/g' /etc/login.defs
else
echo "" >> /etc/login.defs
echo "ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512" >> /etc/login.defs
fi
```

Security identifiers

- CCE-27228-6

References

1. *IA-5(b)*. URL: <<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf>>.
2. *IA-5(c)*. URL: <<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf>>.
3. *IA-5(1)(c)*. URL: <<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf>>.
4. *IA-7*. URL: <<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf>>.
5. *803*. URL: <<http://iase.disa.mil/cci/index.html>>.

SRG-OS-000030	CCI-000058	The operating system must provide the capability for users to directly initiate session lock mechanisms.	A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the system but does not want to log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than be forced to wait for a period of time to expire before the user session can be locked, the operating system needs to provide users with the ability to manually invoke a session lock so users may secure their account should the need arise for them to temporarily vacate the immediate physical vicinity.	Install the screen Package	<p>To enable console screen locking, install the screen package:</p> <pre>\$ sudo yum install screen</pre> <p>Instruct users to begin new terminal sessions with the following command:</p> <pre>\$ screen</pre> <p>The console can now be locked with the following key combination:</p> <pre>ctrl+a x</pre>
SRG-OS-000031	CCI-000060	The operating system session lock mechanism, when activated on a device with a display screen, must place a publicly viewable pattern onto the associated display, hiding what was previously visible on the screen.	A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the system but does not log out because of the temporary nature of the absence. The session lock will also include an obfuscation of the display screen to prevent other users from reading what was previously displayed.	Implement Blank Screensaver	<p>Run the following command to set the screensaver mode in the GNOME desktop to a blank screen:</p> <pre>\$ sudo gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type string \ --set /apps/gnome-screensaver/mode blank-only</pre>
SRG-OS-000032	CCI-000067	The operating system must employ automated mechanisms to facilitate the monitoring and control of remote access methods.	Remote network access is accomplished by leveraging common communication protocols and establishing a remote connection. Remote access is any access to an organizational information system by a user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network (e.g., the Internet). Examples of remote access methods include dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Automated monitoring of remote access sessions allows organizations to audit user activities on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook/laptop computers) and to ensure compliance with remote access policy.	Enable auditd Service	<p>The auditd service is an essential userspace component of the Linux Auditing System, as it is responsible for writing audit records to disk. The auditd service can be enabled with the following command:</p> <pre># chkconfig --level 2345 auditd on</pre>

AC-19(e)	Disable GNOME Automounting	<p>The system's default desktop environment, GNOME, will mount devices and removable media automatically when inserted into the system. Disable automount and autorun within GNOME by running the following commands:</p> <pre># gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /apps/nautilus/preferences/media_automount false</pre> <pre># gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:readwrite:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --type bool \ --set /apps/nautilus/preferences/media_autorun_never true</pre> <p>These settings can be verified by running the following:</p> <pre>\$ gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:read:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --get /apps/nautilus/preferences/media_automount</pre> <pre>\$ gconftool-2 --direct \ --config-source xml:read:/etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory \ --get /apps/nautilus/preferences/media_autorun_never</pre>
CM-7	Disable Mounting of cramfs	<p>To configure the system to prevent the <code>cramfs</code> kernel module from being loaded, add the following to <code>/etc/modprobe.d/modprobe.conf</code>:</p> <pre>install cramfs /bin/false</pre> <p>This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.</p>
CM-7	Disable Mounting of freevxfs	<p>To configure the system to prevent the <code>freevxfs</code> kernel module from being loaded, add the following to <code>/etc/modprobe.d/modprobe.conf</code>:</p> <pre>install freevxfs /bin/false</pre> <p>This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.</p>
CM-7	Disable Mounting of jffs2	<p>To configure the system to prevent the <code>jffs2</code> kernel module from being loaded, add the following to <code>/etc/modprobe.d/modprobe.conf</code>:</p> <pre>install jffs2 /bin/false</pre> <p>This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem.</p>

Rule Results Summary

pass	fixed	fail	error	not selected	not checked	not applicable	informational	unknown	total
7	0	4	2	0	4	0	0	0	11

Title	Result
Ensure gpgcheck Enabled In Main Yum Configuration	pass
Ensure gpgcheck Enabled For All Yum Package Repositories	pass
Direct root Logins Not Allowed	notchecked
Restrict Virtual Console Root Logins	error
Restrict Serial Port Root Logins	error
Restrict Web Browser Use for Administrative Accounts	notchecked
Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login	pass
Verify Only Root Has UID 0	pass
Root Path Must Be Vendor Default	notchecked
Prevent Log In to Accounts With Empty Password	fail
Verify All Account Password Hashes are Shadowed	pass
All GIDs referenced in /etc/passwd must be defined in /etc/group	notchecked
Verify No netrc Files Exist	pass
Set Password Minimum Length in login.defs	fail
Set Password Minimum Age	fail
Set Password Maximum Age	fail

Save XCCDF Result

Save ARF

Open HTML report

Save HTML report

Close

Result for Install AIDE

Result: **pass**

Rule ID: **package_aide_installed**

Time: **2014-12-14 01:15**

Severity: **medium**

Install the AIDE package with the command:

```
# yum install aide
```

The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.

Security identifiers

- CCE-27024-9

Remediation script


```
yum -y install aide
```



```
<rule-result idref="package_aide_installed" time="2014-04-16T05:39:00" severity="medium" weight="1.000000">
  <result>fail</result>
  <ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
  <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
    <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
  </check>
</rule-result>
<rationale xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-US">
  The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.
</rationale>
<ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
<fix xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" system="urn:xccdf:fix:script:sh">
  yum -y install aide
</fix>
<check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
  <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
</check>
```

```
<rule-result idref="package_aide_installed" time="2014-04-16T03:39:28" severity="medium" weight="1.000000">
  <result>fail</result>
  <ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
  <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
    <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
  </check>
</rule-result>

<rationale xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-US">
  The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.
</rationale>
<ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
<fix xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" system="urn:xccdf:fix:script:sh">
  yum -y install aide
</fix>
<check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
  <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
</check>
```



```
<rule-result idref="package_aide_installed" time="2014-04-16T05:39:00" severity="medium" weight="1.000000">
  <result>fail</result>
  <ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
  <check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
    <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
  </check>
</rule-result>

<rationale xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-US">
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```

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<rule-result idref="package_aide_installed" time="2014-04-16T05:39:00" severity="medium" weight="1.000000">
  <result>fail</result>
  <ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
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    <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
  </check>
</rule-result>
<rationale xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en-US">
  The AIDE package must be installed if it is to be available for integrity checking.
</rationale>
<ident system="http://cve.mitre.org">CVE-27024-9</ident>
<fix xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" system="urn:xccdf:fix:script:sh">
  yum -y install aide
</fix>
<check system="http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5">
  <check-content-ref name="oval:ssg:def:244" href="ssg-rhel6-oval.xml"/>
</check>
```

oval:com.redhat.rhsa:def:20130744	true	patch	RHSA-2013:0744-01 CVE-2012-6537 CVE-2012-6538 CVE-2012-6546 CVE-2012-6547 CVE-2013-0349 CVE-2013-0913 CVE-2013-1767 CVE-2013-1773 CVE-2013-1774 CVE-2013-1792 CVE-2013-1796 CVE-2013-1797 CVE-2013-1798 CVE-2013-1826 CVE-2013-1827	RHSA-2013:0744: kernel security and bug fix update (Important)
oval:com.redhat.rhsa:def:20130898	false	patch	RHSA-2013:0898-00 CVE-2013-1993	RHSA-2013:0898: mesa security update (Moderate)
oval:com.redhat.rhsa:def:20130896	false	patch	RHSA-2013:0896-00 CVE-2013-2007	RHSA-2013:0896: qemu-kvm security and bug fix update (Moderate)

SCAP Deployment: CSCF



- Established September 1985 to provide HPC resources for use by the classified NRT and scientific computing communities
 - DS&T was facilitator with SMUG committee of user groups
 - WF took over with consolidation of WF to current management
- CSCF is currently located in ADF-E
 - Applications support – code optimization, code parallelization, conversion, algorithm development/modification
 - O&M support – OS configuration, help desk, backups, disaster recovery, etc

SCAP Deployment: CSCF



- CSCF followed the ICD 503 Six steps with standard controls and Cross Domain System (CDS) controls (CDS is approximately equal to MLS)
- Controls were straight forward
- Testing was very problematic
 - Testers unfamiliar with Linux, much less MLS.
 - Test Output Formatting
 - CSCF moving to SCAP with Red Hat using the xml and html outputs to standardize on with Red Hat support

LOCALIZATION



DATE & TIME

Europe/Prague timezone



LANGUAGE SUPPORT

English (United States)



KEYBOARD

English (English (US))

SECURITY



SECURITY PROFILE

Misconfiguration detected

SOFTWARE



INSTALLATION SOURCE

Closest mirror



SOFTWARE SELECTION

Custom software selected



NETWORK CONFIGURATION

Wired (eth0) connected

STORAGE



LOCALIZATION



DATE & TIME

Europe/Prague timezone



KEYBOARD

English (English (US))



LANGUAGE SUPPORT

English (United States)

SECURITY



SECURITY PROFILE

Misconfiguration detected

SOFTWARE



INSTALLATION SOURCE

Closest mirror



NETWORK CONFIGURATION

Wired (eth0) connected



SOFTWARE SELECTION

Custom software selected

STORAGE



Done

us

Data stream: scap_org.open-scap_datastream_tst ▾

Checklist: scap_org.open-scap_cref_first-xccdf.xml ▾

Choose profile below:

My testing profile

A profile for testing purposes.

My testing profile2

Another profile for testing purposes.

Select profile

Changes that were done or need to be done:


- ✖ /tmp must be on a separate partition or logical volume
- ⚠ root password was too short, a longer one with at least 10 characters will be required
- 💡 package 'iptables' has been added to the list of to be installed packages
- 💡 package 'telnet' has been added to the list of excluded packages

```
1 this is a simple kickstart file for testing OSCP addon's features
2
3 # values saving a lot of clicks in the GUI
4 lang en US.UTF-8
5 keyboard --xlayout=us --vckeymap=us
6 timezone Europe/Prague
7 rootpw aaaaa
8 bootloader --location=mbr
9 clearpart --initlabel --all
10 autopart --type=plain
11
12 %packages
13 vim
14 %end
15
16 %addon org_fedora_oscap
17     content-type = archive
18     content-url = http://192.168.122.1/xccdf_content.zip
19     profile = xccdf_com.stig-rhel6-server
20     xccdf-path = xccdf.xml
21 %end
```


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19     profile = xccdf_com.stig-rhel6-server
20     xccdf-path = xccdf.xml
21 %end
```

PORTABLE WORKLOADS

Data Sources



JBoss Data Virtualization Format consistency



Data Sources

Data Consumers

Report 1

Report 2

Report 3

Report 4

JBoss Data Virtualization
Format consistency

1234567890

123-456-7890

(123)-456-7890

123/456/7890

123,456,7890

[123]-456-7890

Data Sources


Data Sources



Siloed & Complex

JBoss Data
Virtualization


Data
Sources



*Virtualize
Transform
Federate*



*Siloed &
Complex*



[Home](#)[Sample dashboards](#)[Sales opportunities](#)[Expense reports](#)[Test](#)[Administration](#)

Office:

- Select Office -

Department:

- Select Department -

Author:

- Select Author -

Creation date:

- Select Creation date -

Amount:

 to 

Expense Reports

[Sample dashboards](#) > [Expense reports](#)


50 Expense reports

Total amount \$ 22,731.262


Expenses by office USD



Expenses by department USD

[Expense evolution](#)[Expenses by user](#)[Expense reports table](#)

Expense evolution



Component	Risk Score	Avg	% of Score	How Component is Typically Calculated (may be overridden)
VUL - Vulnerability	982.6	3.6	16.4 %	From .1 for the lowest risk vulnerability to 10 for the highest risk vulnerability
PAT - Patch	752.0	2.7	12.6 %	From 3 for each missing "Low" patch to 10 for each missing "Critical" patch
SCM - Security Compliance	0.0	0.0	0.0 %	From .43 for each failed Group Membership check to .9 for each failed Application Log check
AVR - Anti-Virus	240.0	0.9	4.0 %	6 per day for each signature file older than 6 days
UOS - Unapproved OS	0.0	0.0	0.0 %	100 upon detection, then 100 per month up to a maximum of 500
CSA - CyberSecurity Awareness Training	495.0	2.0	9.3 %	After 15 days past the annual training expiration date, 1 per day up to a maximum of 90
SOE - SOE Compliance	140.0	0.5	2.4 %	5 for each missing or incorrect version of an SOE component
ADC - AD Computers	67.0	0.2	1.1 %	1 per day for each day the AD computer password age exceeds 35 days
ADU - AD Users	1,416.0	5.3	24.3 %	1 per day for each account that does not require a smart-card and whose password age > 60, plus 5 additional if the password never expires
SMS - SMS Reporting	1,250.0	4.5	20.9 %	100 + 10 per day for each host not reporting completely to SMS
VUR - Vulnerability Reporting	411.0	1.5	6.9 %	After a host has no scans for 15 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 7 additional days
SCR - Security Compliance Reporting	126.0	0.5	2.1 %	After a host has no scans for 30 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 15 additional days
Total Risk Score	5,879.6	21.7	100.0 %	

WE CAN DO MORE WHEN WE WORK TOGETHER

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DefenseNews